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REINVIGORATE FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
DONALD L. BECI*
INTRODUCTION
Today, Government officials performed an early morning warrantless
search of a local handyman's home. At 2:10 a.m. police kicked in the
door of his house and riddled the dwelling with 183 bullets. Mr.
Durwood Foshee was shot and killed, apparently while still in bed.
The mistaken raid location, chosen on the basis of an informant's
erroneous tip, took place without the constitutional safeguard of a
warrant. The search was performed under one of the exceptions to
the warrant requirement allowed by the Supreme Court. In this case
the reasoning was that the agents did not have the time or geo-
graphic ability to obtain a warrant.'
In this modem day of electronics and computers, we foresee a time in
the near future when the warrant requirement... can be fulfilled
virtually without exception. All that would be needed... would be a
central facility with magistrates on duty and available 24 hours a day.
All police. . . could call in by telephone or other electronic de-
vice .... The magistrates would evaluate [the] facts and, if deemed
sufficient to justify a search and seizure, the magistrate would imme-
diately issue an electronic warrant authorizing the officer on the scene
to proceed.2
* Associate Professor of Law, Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law, Campbell Univer-
sity. B.A., University of Illinois, 1977; M.A., University of Illinois, 1978; J.D., University of
Illinois College of Law, 1984. The author gratefully acknowledges Gerard V. Bradley and Sheldon
H. Nahmod for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. Lee Cumbie and Shannon
Hall provided excellent research assistance. Furthermore, Austyn, Jenna, and Rose Beci are espe-
cially deserving of thanks, as they provided the inspiration and sacrifices that made this article
possible.
1. See Susan Watson, A Little Stress Would Be Too Much, Dur. FREE PRESS, Jan. 16, 1989,
at 3A. Had the police first sought a warrant, a neutral and detached magistrate could have prevent-
ed the search. The magistrate would have denied the warrant if-after reviewing all of the facts,
including the source of the erroneous tip-the magistrate concluded that either probable cause was
lacking or that the anticipated police conduct was unreasonable. See infra part III.A.
2. State v. Brown, 721 P.2d 1357, 1363 n.6 (Or. 1986).
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Searches by government agents should normally be conducted with, rather
than without, pre-approved judicial warrants. The Fourth Amendment's
Warrant Clause provides an essential safeguard against government tyranny
and capriciousness.' The warrant requirement maintains the Fourth
Amendment's delicate balance between the liberty and privacy interests of
each citizen and the safety and security needs of the public. Additionally, the
warrant requirement is consistent with the original intent of the Framers of the
Constitution to limit the government's discretion to search and seize.4 For
more than a century the Supreme Court has stressed the importance of the
warrant requirement.5
Today, however, the Court seems more willing to disregard the Warrant
Clause and instead focus its decisions exclusively on an analysis of the reason-
ableness clause.6 During the past thirty years, the Court has increasingly creat-
ed various exceptions to the warrant requirement.' Indeed, instead of a general
warrant requirement with specific exceptions, one Justice recently submitted
3. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. The Framers did acquiesce, however, in limited types of warrantless searches that were
then permitted under the common law. At the time the Fourth Amendment was drafted, an official
could make a public arrest and conduct a search incident to arrest without a warrant. See infra
text accompanying notes 43-44. This article does not propose that either of these two exceptions
to the warrant requirement be modified or eliminated. The focus of this article is not on those
warrantless searches and seizures permitted when the Fourth Amendment was drafted, but on the
increasing amount and variety of warrantless conduct that has subsequently been permitted.
The first of these two exceptions, a warrantless public arrest, is not inconsistent with this
article's thesis: due to the actual-and not simply theoretical---exigency which is inherent in the
arrest situation, a government agent should be permitted to make a public arrest without a warrant.
See generally United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (allowing a warrantless felony arrest
in public).
While a thorough examination of the second exception, search incident to arrest, is beyond
the scope of this article, it is also generally consistent with this article's thesis: an officer should
generally be permitted to conduct this type of search without a warrant due to the danger that the
arrestee might harm the officer or another person with a concealed weapon or destroy evidence.
See generally Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (permitting a warrantless search incident
to a lawful arrest but limited to the person and the area from which they could obtain a weapon or
destroy evidence).
The search incident to arrest doctrine is also an exception to the probable cause require-
ment. A convincing argument can be made that the exception to the probable cause requirement
should be limited to those situations where one of the exigent circumstances supporting the excep-
tion is actually present, and not just theoretically possible. See generally Tim A. Thomas, Anno-
tation, Constitutionality of Searching Premises Without Warrant as Incident to Valid Ar-
rest----Supreme Court Cases, 108 L. Ed. 2d 987 (1992) (discussing whether a warrantless search of
premises is constitutionally permissible as an incident to a valid arrest). In contrast, searches inci-
dent to arrest are being permitted without warrants even in situations where the arrestee can nei-
ther destroy evidence nor harm anyone. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 466 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("As the facts of this case make clear, the Court today substantially ex-
pands the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest by permitting the police officers to
search areas and containers the arrestee could not possibly reach at the time of the arrest.").
5. See infra text accompanying notes 67-93.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 183-87.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 94-107.
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that a warrant should only be required when a case-by-case analysis indicates
that it is necessary to satisfy the reasonableness requirement The Court has
also been increasingly willing to abandon the warrant requirement, as well as
other Fourth Amendment threshold requirements, by engaging in a "special
needs" analysis.9 These exceptions have become so numerous that the warrant
requirement has become eclipsed by its exceptions) ° Consequently, the Court
has, in many instances, sacrificed the vital safeguards provided by the warrant
requirement.
However, with current computer and electronic telecommunications tech-
nology, police officers can now swiftly obtain a warrant without leaving the
area of investigation. Miniaturization of computer hardware, cellular facsimi-
les, the direct transmission of electronic documents between cellular computer
modems, and other associated technologies, have changed the face of modem
communications. What was not feasible ten years ago is now viable due to
developments in computer and electronic telecommunications technology.
These developments should usher in a renewed commitment to the warrant
requirement.
Part I of this article identifies advancements in available computer and
electronic telecommunications technology, and suggests how this technology
can be used to satisfy the warrant requirement. Advances in technology not
only permit a renewed and robust commitment to the warrant requirement, but
also enable the Supreme Court to correct previous encroachments on Fourth
Amendment principles.
Part II examines the historical evidence in support of the warrant require-
ment and in opposition to government searches without pre-approved judicial
warrants." This Part first argues that the original intent of the Framers of
the Constitution favors a renewed and meaningful commitment to the warrant
requirement. Part II then considers key Supreme Court decisions regarding the
Warrant Clause over a one hundred year period. Finally, this Part argues that
8. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 584-85 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 183-87.
10. Most of these exceptions were initially based on exigency, which applies when
government agents do not have the time or geographic ability to obtain a warrant due to the ur-
gency surrounding the search or seizure. See also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (ex-
plaining that burning fire creates exigency); United States v. McDonald, 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir.
1990) (holding that exigent circumstances existed due to imminent threat of loss of evidence),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1119 (1991); United States v. Riccio, 726 F.2d 638 (1Oth Cir. 1984) (ex-
plaining that entry was justified because officers had a reasonable belief that an individual had
been shot); United States v. Bell, 335 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y.) (permitting magnetometers in
airports by balancing the need for airline safety against the minimal intrusion upon individual
privacy), affd, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972). See generally United
States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir.) (defining exigency as "circumstances that
would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry (or other relevant prompt action) was nec-
essary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evi-
dence, the escape of a suspect, or some consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law en-
forcement efforts"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984).
11. The thesis of this article focuses on judicial warrants. Administrative warrants, such as
those used to inspect for compliance with building codes, are not addressed. For a discussion of
administrative warrants, see generally Bernard A. Nigro, Jr., Note, The Exclusionary Rule in Ad-
ministrative Proceedings, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 564 (1986).
1996]
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it is more consistent with enduring Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to re-
quire that searches be conducted with warrants.
Part III identifies several advantages that flow from government compli-
ance with the warrant requirement. This Part also acknowledges that, for the
identified advantages to emerge, the magistrate's check must be more than a
mere affirmative and spontaneous reflex to the agent's request to search.
Therefore, Part III argues that the warrant process must be strengthened to en-
sure that the magistrate provides a meaningful control on the government's
unchecked discretion. Specific methods are discussed for catalyzing the war-
rant process so as to make the magistrate's assessment more meaningful.
Part IV argues that Congress, state legislatures, and the courts should
implement substantive and procedural incentives to encourage the use of the
warrant process. Likewise, disincentives must be introduced to discourage
agents from engaging in warrantless searches or seizures. The incentives and
disincentives discussed involve changes to the following: an agent's liability
for conducting an unconstitutional search; the time available to a victim to
make a suppression motion; the burdens of production and persuasion appli-
cable in a suppression hearing; the prosecutor's ability to obtain immediate
appellate review of a trial court's suppression ruling; and the class of victims
who have standing to challenge a search.
Part V proposes alternatives to current exceptions to the warrant require-
ment, and warns against the creation of a new exception to the exclusionary
rule. Specifically, this Part examines existing exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement and argues that the exceptions should be eliminated or narrowed
due to the availability of electronic warrants. Second, Part V argues that com-
pliance by government agents with the warrant requirement eliminates the
need for either Congress or the courts to create a new "good faith" exception
to the exclusionary rule for searches or seizures conducted without warrants.
Noting that the existing Leon 2 "good faith" exception already permits the use
of unconstitutionally-obtained evidence against a criminal defendant if it has
been seized with a warrant, this section argues that an additional "good faith"
exception is not only unnecessary, but is also harmful because it abolishes any
significant control on the discretion of government agents to search and seize.
I. DEVELOPMENTS IN COMPUTER AND ELECTRONIC
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
Current technology includes portable and lightweight cellular facsimile
machines. This equipment can be used by an officer in the field or in a squad
car. 3 With a cellular facsimile machine, the officer can quickly, and without
12. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
13. One example of a cellular facsimile machine is the Mitsubishi F5 Access Cellular Fax
Machine available from Sprint Cellular. It is small (12.5" x 8" x 2.4"), lightweight (about 6.5
lbs.), and is powered by an AC adapter plugged into the car cigarette lighter. It can be wired
directly into the vehicle's electrical system for a permanent installation. The machine operates on
an existing cellular phone line and automatically differentiates between voice and data transmis-
sions. Production has already begun on a newer, smaller, more advanced model. Telephone inter-
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leaving the investigation area, transmit a written warrant application and affi-
davit to the magistrate. The magistrate can then transmit the approved warrant
back to the officer. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the proce-
dural rules in a number of states have been amended recently to permit fac-
simile transmission. 4 Reviewing courts have upheld the constitutionality of
warrants obtained through the facsimile procedure. 5 These machines are now
rather standard in the industry and are relatively inexpensive for government
agencies to purchase. Unlike cellular computers, cellular facsimile machines
do not require the purchase of computers.
Current technology also permits electronic transmission directly between
cellular computer modems. Many police vehicles are presently equipped with
laptop computers or motor data terminals. 6 Law enforcement officers can be
supplied with portable and lightweight palm computers or personal digital
assistants. 7 These computers can transmit both the warrant application and
view with Diane Mcllnay, Account Executive, Sprint Cellular (May 11, 1995).
14. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(A) ("If the circumstances make it reasonable to dispense,
in whole or in part, with the written affidavit, a Federal magistrate judge may issue a warrant
based upon sworn testimony communicated by telephone or other appropriate means, including
facsimile transmission."); ALASKA STAT. § 12.35.015(a) (Supp. 1991) (permitting sworn affidavits
to be transmitted via facsimile machine); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1526 (West Supp. 1995) (permit-
ting application for, and issuance of, facsimile warrants); COLO. R. CIuM. P. 41(c)(1)(iv)(3) (al-
lowing the judge to "act upon the transmitted papers as if they were originals"); DEL. J.P. Cr.
CRIM. P. 4.2(c) ("The Court may accept the filings of pleadings designated in this rule [including
search warrants] by facsimile transmission in conjunction with videophone appearance."); IDAHO
CRIM. R. 41 (allowing a warrant to be transmitted by facsimile from magistrate back to peace of-
ficer); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725 para. 5/108-4 (1992) ("The search warrant may be issued electroni-
cally or electromagnetically by use of a facsimile transmission machine and any such warrant shall
have the same validity as a written search warrant."); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 33.05 ("[A] facsimile
order or warrant issued by the court shall have the same force and effect as the original."); R.R.S.
NEB. § 29-814.03 (1994) subject to NEB. CT. R. Fax Machine Use Rule (1994) (permitting fac-
simile warrants when immediacy is required); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-35.4.2 (Supp.
1995) (allowing for facsimile transmission and requiring that original documents be filed with the
court within five business days).
15. See People v. Fournier, 793 P.2d 1176 (Colo. 1990) (upholding a facsimile application
and warrant where all magistrates were out of town at a judicial conference); People v. Paul, 511
N.W.2d 434, 435 n.2 (Mich. 1994) (Levin, J., dissenting) (discussing "widespread use of facsimile
equipment in recent years" and looking favorably upon facsimile warants); People v. Snyder, 449
N.W.2d 703 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding a warrant where officer called magistrate at home
and transmitted unsigned warrant documents to magistrate's home via facsimile, and magistrate
approved and returned warrant by facsimile to officer.); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(A)
advisory committee's note on 1993 amendment ("[F]acsimile transmissions provide some method
of assuring the authenticity of the writing transmitted by the affiant."). For a general survey of
facsimile machine use in the judicial system, see MONICA R. LEE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS, FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION OF COURT DOCUMENTS: A FEASIBILITY STUDY 1990.
16. As an example, the North Carolina Highway Patrol and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Po-
lice Department (N.C.) presently use in-car computers for various tasks. Telephone interview with
Larry Blume, Systems Programmer, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (June 12, 1995). In
addition, throughout the area of North Carolina known as the "Research Triangle," which includes
Wake County, the city of Durham, the city of Raleigh, and the towns of Cary, Chapel Hill, and
Gamer, laptops and/or motor data terminals (MDTs) are being used. Elizabeth Wellington, Ma-
chines Help Cary Police Take Byte Out of Crime: In-Car Computers Ease Officers' Jobs, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 31, 1995, at BI.
17. A hand-held computer can be either a personal digital assistant (PDA), which is accessed
with a pen rather than a keyboard, or a palm computer, which is accessed via a keyboard. One
example of a currently available, suitable, portable, lightweight palm computer is the Hewlett
Packard HP 200 LX. It has the processor capability to run a graphics program which would allow
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the approved warrant electronically-directly from the officer's computer to
the magistrate's computer and then back again-through a cellular modem.
The confidentiality of these transmissions can be protected through the use of
existing encryption technology."8 If a paper copy of the issued warrant is de-
sired, a portable printer can be used. 9 Electronic copies of the application
and the warrant can be routinely and automatically retained, one on the
magistrate's hard drive and the other on the agent's computer. For security
and historical accuracy, the magistrate's hard drive could also be systematical-
ly copied and inventoried. Procedural rules in some states have already been
amended to permit use of such electronic transmission.20 Courts that have
addressed warrants obtained via electronic transmission suggest that there are
no constitutional impediments to their use.2' One unresolved detail that must
be addressed is the development of a method to authenticate one's electronic
signature.22 Such authentication is necessary to satisfy the requirement that
the affiant's information be provided under oath or affirmation.23 It is this
an officer to view and complete the warrant application on the screen, a modem to transmit the
application to a magistrate for approval and receive the approved warrant back, and a printer port
which could be used with a portable printer to produce a hard copy of the approved warrant. It
also has the capability to utilize a portable scanner to input a handwritten application. The phys-
ical dimensions of the HP 200 LX are 16 x 8.64 x 2.54 (cm). It weighs approximately II ounces.
Telephone interview with Lucy Honig, Product Manager, Hewlett Packard (Aug. 9, 1995).
18. Various software programs exist which allow for encryption of text prior to transmission
via facsimile or modem. Alternatively, existing hardware also can be used to scramble the output
of the cellular transmission. Encryption rearranges the order of the transmission signals into an
unintelligible format which prevents anyone who intercepts a transmission from understanding the
contents. A decryption device is used at the receiver to rearrange the transmission signals so they
may be understood. Technology would prevent sophisticated criminals from monitoring police re-
quests for warrants, denying them the opportunity to dispose of any incriminating evidence prior
to a search. See generally Cryptology, in 16 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 860 (15th ed.
1995) (discussing various methods to secure communications).
19. The Hewlett Packard HP 320 Portable Deskjet Printer is one example. It is available in
black/grey scale or color printing options, 300 dpi resolution, and it prints at about 3 pages per
minute. The unit easily fits into a briefcase. Its dimensions are 12"W x 9.5"D x 2.5"H. Telephone
interview with Lucy Honig, supra note 17.
20. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-39149(c) (1989) ("telephone, radio or other
means of electronic communication"); LA. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 162.1 (West Supp. 1995)
("may be communicated ... by telephone, radio, or other such electronic method of communica-
tion deemed appropriate by the judge"); OKLA. R. WSDCND W.D.R. 36 (1995) ("telephone or
other appropriate means"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-204 (1995). But see FED. R. CRIM. P.
41(c)(2)(A) advisory committee's note on 1993 amendment ("The Committee considered, but
rejected, amendments to the Rule which would have permitted other means of electronic transmis-
sion, such as the use of computer modems.").
21. See, e.g., Califomia v. McCraw, 276 Cal. Rptr. 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a
warrant sent electronically from Washington to California is as effective as the original).
22. Software technology currently exists which allows the user to actually sign the computer
screen with a special pen (i.e. a screen signature). The signature is then added directly into the
electronic document. Another option is a scanner which would input the signature into the docu-
ment prior to transmission. Telephone interview with Lucy Honig, supra note 17.
23. This problem has already been resolved when a warrant is obtained via facsimile or
telephone transmission. Courts have upheld oaths taken over the phone, by a third party, or at a
later date. See, e.g., Mills v. Graves, 930 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding telephonic search
warrant valid even where oath was taken five days later); People v. Fournier, 793 P.2d 1176
(Colo. 1990) (explaining that facsimile warrant was valid where oath was taken by clerk of court
prior to facsimile transmission); People v. Paul, 511 N.W.2d 434, 449 n.2 (Mich. 1989) (Levin, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing that a magistrate may "orally administer an oath or affirmation by tele-
phone"). Unlike oral telephone warrants, however, these additional steps are arguably unnecessary
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technology, permitting a police officer to apply for a warrant electronically via
a cellular modem on a small computer located within the squad car, that this
article prefers. The production and transmission of electronic documents
directly between computer modems would be quicker than the facsimile proce-
dure described above and would eliminate legibility problems. In addition, this
application is not as experimental as the miniaturized computers, which are
discussed next.
Ongoing miniaturization of computer hardware increasingly facilitates the
use of computer warrants. Computers have decreased in size from desktop to
laptop, laptop to notebook, and notebook to personal digital assistant. More-
over, a wearable computer, which can be clipped to one's belt, is now avail-
able.2" A wearable computer is a miniaturized version of an IBM-compatible
486 and, along with its battery, weighs less than three pounds.' The com-
puter is voice-activated and has no keyboard.26 It was designed for hand-free
operation, but can also be accessed with a small mouse." While the monitor
measures only one-half inch in diameter, it produces a display which appears
much larger.28 Police should not be required to possess wearable computers
until further study determines if this equipment can be used without interfering
with an officer's mobility.29 But the availability of this hardware today is an
encouraging sign that numerous possibilities for electronic warrants will be
available in the near future.
Today's technology frees the Supreme Court from the dilemma in which
it has been mired. The Court no longer must choose between the warrant re-
quirement, which protects liberty interests, and warrantless searches, which
permit the government to move swiftly in exigent circumstances. An effective
warrant process can be reclaimed and preserved, and the officer can proceed
quickly without leaving the area of investigation.
when a warrant is requested via facsimile transmission. The oath or affirmation requirement is
satisfied when the magistrate receives a facsimile copy of the affiant's signature formally attesting
to the truth of the statements in the warrant application.
24. The wearable computer was developed by and is available from InterVision Systems
Inc., Raleigh, N.C. It was designed to be used with an attached video camera by service techni-
cians in the field, and it has been purchased by the Army after being tested during war exercises.
David Ranii, The Ultimate in Computer Portability: Raleigh Firm Makes Wearable Computer,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 5, 1995, at DI. In addition, federal law enforcement
agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Agency, are
presently considering its surveillance applications. Telephone Interview with John Lontos, Co-
founder, InterVision Systems Inc. (Aug. 5, 1995).
25. It is likely that wearable computers will weigh even less in the future considering the
current version weighs half as much as the previous model. Ranii, supra note 24, at D6.
26. Id. at DI.
27. Id.
28. Id. The monitor is attached to the user's cap or helmet, and can be ignored without ob-
structing the user's regular vision. Id.
29. The price of the wearable computer-between $8,000 and $12,000-may also be an
obstacle to its current use. But the price is likely to be reduced as anticipated competitors enter the
market. The price has already been reduced from its original price of $20,000. Id. at D6.
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II. HISTORICAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
A. The Warrant Requirement Is Consistent with the Framers' Intent to Limit
Government Discretion to Search and Seize 0
The Framers' original intent when creating the Fourth Amendment of the
Bill of Rights is consistent with a renewed and meaningful commitment to the
general principle that a government agent must first obtain a warrant before
conducting a search or seizure. Even though the Framers implicitly approved
of certain types of warrantless searches,"' the Framers' overriding intent was
to limit the government's general discretion to search and seize.3"
While many legal historians have attempted to comprehend the mosaic of
what the Framers meant by the Amendment,3 they have reached dissimilar
conclusions. 4 These scholars generally agree that the Amendment was in-
tended as a means of controlling governmental intrusion into an individual's
privacy.35 Legal historians disagree, however, as to how the Framers foresaw
that the Amendment would accomplish this purpose. Some have concluded
that the Framers intended that the Amendment prohibit any search or seizure
conducted without a warrant. Others have concluded that the Framers intended
that the absence of a warrant be only one factor considered in determining
whether the search or seizure is reasonable and therefore constitutional. 6 This
30. The author gratefully acknowledges Lee Cumbie for his research, suggestions, and
contributions to this section.
31. See supra note 4.
32. There are many early writings warning of the danger that the government may usurp
power and intrude on individual liberties. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 79 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (warning against giving to "men disposed to usurp, a plausible
pretence for claiming that power"); 21 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 445-49 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1881) (quoting Patrick
Henry's warning against the terrors of federal authority without a protective bill of rights); John
Adams, Petition of Lechmere: Adam's "Abstract of the Argument", reprinted in 2 LEGAL PAPERS
OF JOHN ADAMS 134, 142-44 (L. Kinven Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965) (condemning the
abuse of power that resulted from the use of general warrants and writs of assistance).
33. An in depth discussion of the historical events leading up to the Fourth Amendment is
beyond the scope of this article. For thorough attention to this history, see generally JACOB W.
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966); NELSON B. LASSON, THE
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTrTU-
TION (1937); JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETrS BAY, BETWEEN 1761-1772 (1865);
TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1969).
34. Compare Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349 (1974) (generally viewing exceptions to the warrant requirement as granting too much
discretionary power to law enforcement officers) and LANDYNSKI, supra note 33, at 42-44 (advo-
cating that it clearly was not the Framers' intent to allow judicially created exceptions to the war-
rant requirement except in compelling circumstances) with TAYLOR, supra note 33, at 46-47
("[Those] who have viewed the fourth amendment primarily as a requirement that searches be
covered by warrants, have stood the amendment on its head. Such was not the history of the mat-
ter, such was not the original understanding.") and Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Consti-
tution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1179 (1991) ("We can now see the Fourth Amendment with fresh
eyes. Searches without warrants are not presumptively illegitimate. Rather... a jury could subse-
quently assess its reasonableness.").
35. See supra note 33.
36. See supra note 34; see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581-83 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971).
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article suggests that the positions are at the same time both accurate and inac-
curate. Furthermore, this article contends that today the Framers' original
intent is best satisfied through the warrant requirement.
Historical certainty as to the Framers' precise meaning of the
Amendment's terms may never be obtained.37 Such a microscopic inquiry
may be counterproductive. As noted by Alexander Hamilton in his initial
opposition to the Bill of Rights: "[M]inute detail of particular rights is cer-
tainly far less applicable to a Constitution like that under consideration, which
is merely intended to regulate the general political interests of the nation, than
to a constitution which has the regulation of every species of personal and
private concerns.""
An historical inquiry into the Framers' general intent, their purpose in
creating the Amendment, and their desires as to what the Amendment was to
accomplish would be more productive than a detailed study of the
Amendment's specific terms. Only by understanding the dangers and threats to
individual liberty that the Framers were attempting to avoid, can one interpret
and apply the Fourth Amendment with genuine deference to the Framers'
original intent.
This article suggests that the Framers of the Constitution had a three-
tiered approach in mind when promulgating the Fourth Amendment. First, the
Framers implicitly approved of the status of the limited types of warrantless
searches permitted under the common law at the time. Arguably, this ap-
proval was based on the assumption that common law remedies, such as suits
for trespass and false imprisonment, would continue to prevent such warrant-
less searches from becoming onerous. Second, the Framers intended to require
that any extensions in search and seizure doctrine pass through a warrant
requirement. ' This would limit the types of warrantless searches to those al-
ready permitted under the then-existing common law. Third, clear limits would
be placed on the government's ability to obtain a warrant by requiring that
certain conditions be satisfied before a magistrate issues the warrant.4 The
overall effect of this three-tiered approach was to encapsulate and limit the
power of the government to invade the "right of the people to be secure in
37. The wording of the Fourth Amendment was altered from the form proposed by the Com-
mittee of Eleven and initially approved by the House of Representatives. Purportedly, Chairman
Benson of the committee charged with preparing the final draft, changed the text to conform with
an earlier version that he had proposed. The House had already soundly rejected Benson's pro-
posed version. Without comment, and presumably unaware of the change, the House then passed
the altered version. The Senate approved the altered version, and it was ratified by the States. This
revised version became the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 180-
83 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (setting out the Amendment's history); LASSON, supra note 33,
at 97-103 (referencing 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS (I. Gales ed., 1834) to show this sequence of
events); see also Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of 'Search' in the
Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IOWA L. REv. 541, 541-53 (1988) (illustrat-
ing the linguistic analysis of the Fourth Amendment and its confusing history).
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 579 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
39. See supra note 4 and infra notes 43-44.
40. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
19961
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
their persons, houses, papers, and effects"42 from either a warrantless search
or a search conducted with a warrant.
The first of these three tiers-that the Framers approved of the limited
types of warrantless searches then permitted under the common law-is evi-
denced by the Framers' failure to explicitly respond in the Amendment to two
realities. At the time the Framers created the Fourth Amendment, the common
law permitted two types of warrantless searches and seizures: an official could
conduct a search incident to arrest without a warrant,43 and certain arrests
could be made without a warrant." Most of the original states generally
adopted the English common law as the law of the state unless specifically
preempted by state or federal law.45 Yet in drafting the Amendment, the
Framers did nothing to explicitly abrogate these common law warrantless
searches.' Therefore, it is unlikely the Framers intended the Fourth
Amendment's Warrant Clause to preempt the common law doctrine. The
Framers would have expressly eliminated the common law doctrine permitting
warrantless searches if it were their intent to do so. It would be inconsistent
for the Framers to articulate explicitly the standards of a warrant requirement,
and simultaneously abrogate the longstanding common law doctrine permitting
warrantless searches through implication.4
Because of the system of checks and balances, the Framers arguably
acquiesced to these limited types of warrantless searches. Abuse of these war-
rantless searches had been deterred historically through actions such as tres-
pass and false imprisonment:' officials who conducted warrantless searches
were generally not entitled to immunity unless vindicated by finding the felon
or illegal goods;49 there was no "good faith" exception for mistakes;5' and
recovery for trespass could be substantial because it was not limited to actual
damages.' Presumably, the Framers felt that these safeguards provided an
42. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
43. The first case challenging the ancient search doctrine in England was not until the late
nineteenth century. Dillon v. O'Brien, 16 Cox C.C. 245 (Ex. D. 1887) (rejecting the challenge and
affirming the doctrine's validity).
44. See generally LASSON, supra note 33 (discussing permissible warrantless arrests in colo-
nial times); TAYLOR, supra note 33 (same). One could also be arrested without a warrant "upon
hue and cry" when the officer was unable to find the felon. WILLIAM SHEPPARD, THE OFFICES OF
CONSTABLES, ch. 8, § 2, no.4 (1650).
45. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1917 (1995) ("Most of the States that ratified
the Fourth Amendment had enacted constitutional provisions or statutes generally incorporating
English common law .... "); see also N.J. CONST. of 1776, § 22, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 2598 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. 35, reprint-
ed in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2635; ORDINANCES OF MAY 1776, ch. 5,
§ 6, reprinted in 9 STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA 127 (W. Hening ed., 1821).
46. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In addition, none of the variations of the Fourth Amend-
ment adopted in state constitutions expressly abrogated the common law warrantless search doc-
trine. See 3-5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 45.
47. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 33, at 27-29 (providing alternative analyses support-
ing the argument that the Framers did not intend to prohibit the limited types of warrantless
searches then permitted under the common law); Amar, supra note 34, at 1175-81 (same).
48. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW
582-84 (2d ed. 1903).
49. Id.
50. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 17 (1975); Akhil R.
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1486-87, 1506-07 (1987).
51. See Wilkes v. Halifax, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1382, 1401 (1769) (permitting substantial re-
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ample deterrent against abuse of the limited types of searches permitted with-
out a warrant. These warrantless searches had been permitted in the colonies,
and for several hundred years in England, without creating significant prob-
lems for the individual or the public. 2 The Framers did not see a need to
prohibit the limited types of warrantless searches then permitted under the
common law because there were relatively few professional police in colonial
times. 3
The Framers were keenly aware, however, of the inherent dangers arising
from a government with unbridled discretion to search and seize. In crafting
the Fourth Amendment, the Framers intended to deter the virtually limitless
searching which took place under general warrants and writs of assistance. The
inequities which resulted from abuse of the general warrant and the writs of
assistance are well documented54 and were a major impetus in the occurrence
of the American revolution.5
While these abusive searches were technically conducted with warrants,
the general warrant and the writs of assistance did not limit government dis-
cretion. The Framers were concerned that unless the warrantless system was
limited, it would lead to the type of abuse which occurred under general war-
rants and writs of assistance. This insight and anxiety led to the second and
third tiers of the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause. While they acquiesced
to the limited types of warrantless searches permitted under the common law,
the Framers intended that a warrant requirement--one with teeth-be imposed
upon any new type of search subsequently arising.
Under the second tier, a government agent would have to obtain a warrant
from a neutral magistrate before conducting a search or seizure.56 This re-
quirement placed a check on unregulated government intrusion into individual
liberty and privacy, regardless of the number of new types of searches arising
or the increasing number of government officials engaged in searching activi-
covery from Earl (Lord) Halifax, Secretary of State and Lord of the King's Privy Council, and
demonstrating the lack of immunity by even high ranking government officials); Wilkes v. Wood,
98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
52. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 48.
53. See id. "IT]here is no professional police force. The only persons specially bound to
arrest malefactors are the sheriff, his bailiffs and servants and the bailiffs of those lords who have
the higher regalities." Id. at 582.
54. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Halifax, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1382, 1401 (1769); Entick v. Carrington,
19 Howell St. Tr. 1029 (1765); Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763); 2 LEGAL PAPERS
OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 32, at 106-47.
55. See 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 32, at 107 ("Then and there the child
Independence was born."). The General Warrant was authorized during the reign of Charles I1.
Chief Justice Scroggs upheld the warrant's validity after its statutory authorization expired, but he
was subsequently impeached by the House of Commons for having done so. The King v. Scroggs,
8 Cobbett St. Tr. 163, 192-93, 200 (1680); Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1029, 1071-72
(1765). In addition, two types of statutory warrants, the Writ of Assistance and the Special War-
rant (to search out seditious libel), were similar to general warrants in that they authorized uncon-
trolled government searches. Used in both England and the Colonies, their abuse is generally
credited with creating the impetus for the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 33. These statutory
warrants were consistently compared unfavorably to the common law stolen goods warrant for not
containing the same quality of safeguards. See supra note 54 and infra text accompanying notes
59-61.
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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ties. As noted by the Supreme Court approximately two hundred years later,
"The prominent place the warrant requirement is given in our decisions
reflects the basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be
preserved through a separation of powers and division of functions among the
different branches and levels of government."57
However, because the Framers recognized that the government could
become abusive in a system where searches are conducted with warrants, the
third tier placed limits on what the government was able to do with a war-
rant.5" To prevent abuse of the warrant process, the Framers placed particular
requirements in the Fourth Amendment which were modeled after the condi-
tions required to obtain a common law stolen goods warrant. A common law
stolen goods warrant required the victim of a theft to make an oath before a
Justice of the Peace, demonstrating probable cause that the stolen goods would
be found in a particular place.59 The Justice would then issue a warrant au-
thorizing the victim and a constable to search and seize the goods and bring
the goods and the suspected felon back before the Justice for disposition.'
Failure to find the goods left the oath-giver open to an action for damages.6t
Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrant requires specificity, oath, probable
cause, and approval by a neutral and detached magistrate.62 The magistrate
limits oppressive government searches by refusing to issue a warrant if any of
the requirements are not satisfied or if the intended search is unreasonable.63
This requirement protects the individual from government abuse of warrant
power similar to that which had been common under English rule. '
Consequently, in the second and third tiers the Framers sought to limit
warrantless searches, and warrant searches, respectively. These tiers work
together to prevent capricious searches in all situations where a warrant is
required for a search. The historical evidence suggests that the warrant
requirement was seen as a double-edged sword which would have to be care-
fully utilized in order to preclude causing the very harm it was designed to
prevent. While the Framers endorsed an enhanced warrant requirement' as a
means of controlling government discretion, they were also keenly aware that
a toothless warrant requirement would lead to a more intrusive government.
Today, the Framers' original intent to limit government discretion to
search and seize can best be satisfied through a strengthened warrant require-
ment. The current exceptions to the warrant requirement allow for a plethora
57. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979) (quoting United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972)).
58. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
59. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, ch. 18, 149r-52 (published posthumously, 1609-76).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
63. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (denying the government a search warrant, even
though probable cause was satisfied, to surgically remove evidence, a bullet, from an individual,
because the intended search was unreasonable).
64. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
65. For a discussion of specific methods to strengthen the warrant process, see infra part
II.B.
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of warrantless searches other than those historically permitted under the com-
mon law. Requiring a government agent to obtain a warrant before conducting
a search or seizure still allows the government to investigate, but only in a
controlled fashion. Modem technology facilitates timely searches, without
sacrificing the protection of a warrant.
B. The Warrant Requirement Is Consistent with the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment Precedents66
Despite the willingness of some current Justices to dispense with the
warrant requirement, the Supreme Court has underscored the importance of the
warrant requirement for more than one hundred years. It is more consistent
with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to require that searches be conducted
with warrants.67 It would further the Supreme Court's guiding role if the
Court were to eliminate or narrow some of the exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement, and rearticulate an earnest commitment to
the principle that government agents must first obtain a warrant before con-
ducting a search or seizure.
Stare decisis requires that courts abide by decided cases and adhere to
precedent."t Because stare decisis makes the law more predictable, individual
citizens, the community, and government agents can more easily conduct
themselves in accordance with the law. Such consistency and predictability are
particularly important in criminal law where community safety, individual
privacy, and individual liberty interests are at stake.
As previously suggested, the Framers of the Constitution created the
Fourth Amendment to protect individuals from the arbitrary and capricious
behavior of the government. "[T]he forefathers, after consulting the lessons of
history, designed our Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too per-
meating police surveillance, which they seemed to think was a greater danger
to free people than the escape of some criminals from punishment." '69
When the courts do not adhere to precedent, they fail to guide police offi-
cers and other government agents. Consequently, such agents are left to decide
how to balance public safety against individual privacy interests and, in their
zeal to protect the public, they may search individuals without reason. It is
66. The author gratefully acknowledges Shannon Hall for her research, suggestions, and
contributions to this section.
67. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a search conducted without a
warrant is unreasonable. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Furthermore, the
Court has consistently held that unreasonable searches and seizures are forbidden by the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). Consequently, except in narrow circumstances of absolute
necessity, warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 768 (1969).
68. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct 2791, 2808 (1992) ("[T]he very con-
cept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a
respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable."); Lewis F. Powell Jr., Stare Decisis and
Judicial Restraint, 1991 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 13, 16.
69. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
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important, therefore, that the Supreme Court follow precedent and fulfill its
guiding role.
Over the years, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the
warrant requirement. In 1877, the Supreme Court held that a government agent
must first obtain a warrant before searching mailed letters and packages.7"
The Court concluded that the warrant required to search or seize mail demands
the same particularity and probable cause required to search or seize papers
within one's house.7 Significantly, the Court did not question the postulate
that the government can search for such papers with a warrant in the home.
In the early 1900s, the Court emphasized that probable cause alone, with-
out a warrant, is generally not enough to search one's home.72 The Court
held that the "[b]elief, however well founded, that an Article sought is con-
cealed in a dwelling house, furnishes no justification for a search of that place
without a warrant."73 The Court emphasized that the judicial magistrate is
essential in the warrant process. Notably, the Supreme Court also has held that
the "informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue
warrants... are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers and others
who happen to make arrests."74
The Court continued to emphasize the necessity of magistrates and "ad-
herence to judicial processes '75 during the middle of the twentieth century.
The purpose of interposing a magistrate between the police officer and the
citizen was to ensure that a citizen's privacy and possessory interests were not
overtaken by overzealous police officers. The Supreme Court eloquently ex-
pressed this thought in Johnson v. United States:
76
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which is often not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of
the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.77
In several decisions the Court held that the "essential purpose of the
Fourth Amendment [is] to shield the citizen from unwarranted intrusions into
[the citizen's] privacy."78 For example, in Jones v. United States,79 the Court
found that a search conducted at night and with probable cause was unconsti-
tutional because the warrant to search was limited to daytime hours. The Court
has consistently held that probable cause without a warrant is generally not
enough to search a home. 0 Noting the important role of the magistrate in the
70. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
71. Id. at 732.
72. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
73. Id.
74. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
75. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
76. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
77. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-14.
78. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958).
79. 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
80. Jones, 357 U.S. at 498. "Were federal officers free to search without a warrant merely
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warrant process, the Court announced:
In a doubtful case, when the officer does not have clearly convincing
evidence of the immediate need to search, it is most important that
resort be had to a warrant, so that the evidence in the possession of
the police may be weighed by an independent judicial officer, whose
decision, not that of the police, may govern whether liberty or privacy
is to be invaded.8
In the 1960s and early 1970s, the Court took advantage of many oppor-
tunities to guide and lead, repeatedly holding that a warrant is generally re-
quired to search.82 In Rios v. United States, 3 the Court held that a warrant-
less search could not be justified as a search incident to arrest because proba-
ble cause for arrest did not exist when the police officers approached the peti-
tioner.84 Consequently, the police could not search without a warrant. In
Stoner v. California,85 the Court ruled that a hotel guest is entitled to the
same constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures that
the guest would have in his own home.86 The Court concluded that if the
search is conducted without a warrant, "[it] can survive constitutional inhibi-
tion only upon a showing that the surrounding facts brought it within one of
the exceptions to the rule that a search must rest upon a search warrant.
'87
The Court reasserted the constitutional significance of the magistrate's prede-
termination that probable cause is present in Beck v. Ohio.88 Finding a war-
rantless arrest unconstitutional, the Court stated that "the far less reliable
procedure [of] an after-the-event justification for the arrest or search [is] too
likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judg-
ment.' '89 In Katz v. United States,"° the Court held that an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation from a public telephone
and a warrant is required to listen to that conversation.9 Without a warrant,
such a search is unconstitutional even if government agents have probable
cause to believe they will discover evidence of a crime and the officers use
the least intrusive means to obtain the evidence.92 Emphasizing the historical
importance of the warrant requirement, the Court stated:
upon probable cause to believe that certain articles were within a home, the provisions of the
Fourth Amendment would become empty phrases, and the protection it affords largely nullified."
Id.
81. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1960).
82. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (holding that a landlord's
consent was not enough to justify a warrantless search); see also Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 32 (1925) ("[We have] always ... assumed, that one's house cannot lawfully be searched
without a search warrant .... ").
83. 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
84. Rios, 364 U.S. at 261.
85. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
86. Stoner, 376 U.S. at 490.
87. Id. at 486.
88. 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
89. Beck, 379 U.S. at 96.
90. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
91. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
92. Id. at 356-57.
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The warrant requirement has been a valued part of our constitutional
law for decades .... It is not an inconvenience to be somehow
"weighed" against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should be,
an important working part of our machinery of government, operating
as a matter of course to check the "well-intentioned but mistakenly
overzealous executive officers" who are a part of any system of law
enforcement.93
For more than one hundred years, the Court has emphasized the impor-
tance of the warrant requirement. Recently, however, it has been increasingly
willing to dismiss the Warrant Clause and create additional exceptions to the
warrant requirement. Even without a warrant, police are free to make a pro-
tective sweep in a home after an arrest,94 search a foreign national's property
located outside the United States,95 search and seize curbside garbage,"
search privately owned open fields,97 and search some mobile homes.98 Sim-
ilarly, government agents without a warrant may search the entire passenger
compartment of a vehicle, and all closed containers therein," as well as open
and search an arrestee's possessions."° Government agents may avoid the
warrant requirement by obtaining the consent of a third-party to search,' or
they may obtain an individual's consent and search without a warrant, regard-
less of whether the individual truly understands the right to refuse."° Fur-
thermore, police who have not obtained a judicial warrant'0 3 may seize any-
thing seen within "plain view,"'" stop and frisk a citizen with only "reason-
able suspicion,"'' 5 conduct administrative searches,"° and conduct a search,
or seize items, when any of a vast variety of exigent circumstances are
present."3
93. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971).
94. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
95. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
96. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
97. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
98. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (permitting the warrantless search of a motor
home when the motor home comes within an extended version of the automobile exception).
99. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (extending the search incident to arrest doc-
trine).
100. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (permitting the opening and search of
an arrestee's items, pursuant to a standardized procedure, such as an inventory search).
101. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
102. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
103. See infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text (addressing additional exceptions to the
warrant requirement under the Court's "special needs" analysis). But see Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466
U.S. 740 (1984) (rejecting an exception for the nighttime entry into a home to arrest for a civil
traffic offense); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984) (declining to create a broad exception
to cover searches for arson after a fire); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (resisting an
invitation to permit an automatic exception to the warrant requirement for the in-home arrest of all
felons); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (refusing to create a broad exception to the war-
rant requirement for prolonged searches of murder scenes).
104. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464 (1971).
105. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
106. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (holding that warrants to conduct ad-
ministrative inspections do not need to be based upon "probable cause" but instead can be based
upon a "reasonable governmental interest" in conducting periodic, areawide inspections).
107. See infra part V.A.
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The Supreme Court must recommit itself to requiring that law enforce-
ment officers conduct searches with warrants. The Court satisfies stare decisis
when it interprets the Fourth Amendment consistent with precedent.' Lower
courts, prosecutors, the defense bar, and law enforcement personnel all benefit
from such consistent interpretation." 9
III. THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
MUST BE RE-EMBRACED AND STRENGTHENED
The Supreme Court must earnestly articulate its commitment to the princi-
ple that government agents must first obtain a warrant before conducting a
search or seizure. Although considerable benefits can be obtained through the
use of warrants, the process must also be enhanced so that the magistrate's
assessment is meaningful. Unfortunately, the warrant process has at times
operated in such a way that some of its theoretical advantages have been illu-
sive." The magistrate's determinations of probable cause and reasonableness
must not merely be affirmative and spontaneous reflexes to a government
agent's request for a warrant. The magistrate must be more than a "rubber
stamp.""' The warrant process must be enhanced to effectively establish a
balance between the privacy and sanctity of the individual citizen (in places
such as the home) and the discretion of the government to invade, search, and
impound. This section first discusses several benefits that could result from
compliance with the warrant requirement. It then suggests specific methods to
strengthen the warrant process so that these benefits are actualized.
A. Advantages Flowing from Magistrates and the Warrant Process
The warrant requirement does not prevent legitimate government searches.
Rather, it serves as a check on the discretion of the police and other govern-
ment officials. It accomplishes this in two ways. First, the magistrate must
confirm that the officer has probable cause to believe that the area to be
searched contains-or that the item to be seized is--contraband or evidence of
a crime. " ' Second, the magistrate must also evaluate the intended police
conduct to determine if it complies with the reasonableness clause of the
108. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 392 (1958) (recognizing that a long course of adju-
dication in the Supreme Court carries impressive authority); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665
(1944) (noting that continuity of decisions on constitutional questions is desirable).
109. See generally Donald L. Beci, School Violence: Protecting Our Children and the Fourth
Amendment, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 817, 836-37 (1992) (discussing the harm that results from the
Court's lack of guidance when it succumbs to the temptation to issue politically popular, result-
oriented decisions without regard to established Fourth Amendment precedent).
110. See Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The Use,
Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 442 (1990) (arguing that issuing magistrates should base their decisions upon objective crite-
ria rather than simply deferring to the requesting agent's conclusions).
11. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964) (stating that the probable cause decision
must be made by a neutral and detached magistrate "[and that] the courts must ... insist that the
magistrate ... perform his 'neutral and detached' function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp
for the police").
112. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
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Fourth Amendment: the desired search or seizure must be reasonable in light
of all attending circumstances." '
The quintessential advantage of the warrant process is that a magistrate is
in a better position than the criminal investigator to determine reasonableness
and probable cause without bias," 4 haste,"' or competitiveness." 6 The
Supreme Court has invariably acknowledged this advantage." A magistrate
is assumed to have no bias or partiality between the individual citizen, whose
liberty interest may be encroached upon, and the government agent, who seeks
to uncover criminal activity. "' In contrast, the agent has a personal role in
the ongoing criminal investigation, which may generate intense emotion and
some animosity. "' An unbiased and impartial magistrate is customarily in a
better position to determine reasonableness and probable cause than an officer
who is immersed in what may unfold into an intense and emotional criminal
investigation. There are at least five additional advantages.
The first advantage is that the warrant process benefits the innocent, law-
abiding citizen because it provides a check on a government agent's actions
before the agent conducts an unconstitutional search or seizure. The warrant
requirement is preventive rather than remedial. If the magistrate determines
that a proposed search or seizure is unreasonable or not supported by probable
cause, the warrant is denied and the search or seizure never occurs. 2 ' The
citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy has not been violated, and the
citizen is not even aware of the government's intended breach. The warrant
requirement balances individual privacy and liberty interests against intended
law enforcement efforts. In the process, the warrant requirement protects the
law-abiding citizen from overzealous government officials. In balancing indi-
vidual privacy concerns and public safety, attention is focused on the privacy
interests of the innocent individual. This is done without sacrificing reasonable
law enforcement efforts.
In contrast, when a judge reviews a warrantless search or seizure after the
113. This safeguard allows the magistrate to deny a warrant for a search that is excessively
intrusive, highly repugnant, or otherwise unreasonable, even if the officer has probable cause to
believe the search will yield contraband or evidence. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
114. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) ("ITlhe Amendment does not place an
unduly oppressive weight on law enforcement officers but merely interposes an orderly procedure
under the aegis of judicial impartiality that is necessary to attain the beneficent purposes intend-
ed.").
115. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 110. "[T]he informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates
empowered to issue warrants ... are to be preferred ... ." Id. (quoting United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932)).
116. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14 (preferring a "neutral and detached magistrate instead of... the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime").
117. See, e.g., Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967).
118. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963).
119. See Cynthia L. Cordes & Thomas W. Dougherty, A Review and an Integration of Re-
search on Job Burnout, 18 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 621 (1993).
120. But see United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1230-31 (7th Cir.) (permitting the police
to circumvent the magistrate's denial and obtain a warrant from another magistrate based on the
same facts), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1030 (1990). While the Supreme Court has not yet addressed
the permissibility of such "magistrate shopping," it is the author's position that the Court should
prohibit or discourage such conduct. See infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
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fact, during a suppression hearing, it is too late for preventive measures. In-
stead, the judge's only option is remedial: suppression can be granted, depriv-
ing the prosecution of the use of incriminating evidence and benefiting the
guilty defendant. 2 ' It is this belief-that exclusion serves as a windfall to
the guilty defendant-that has led to much of the public opposition to the
exclusionary rule.'22 Exclusion attempts to balance individual privacy and
liberty interests against intended law enforcement efforts; in the process the
defendant gains a windfall.
The second advantage stems from the magistrate's opportunity to regularly
participate in continuing education regarding developments in search and sei-
zure law. Similar opportunities are typically unavailable to law enforcement
officers. Continuing education is critical in this context, because, unlike many
other areas of the law, courts are constantly reexamining and reinterpreting the
Fourth Amendment. 23 The magistrate is in a better position to remain up to
date on developments in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; thus, the
magistrate's determinations of probable cause and reasonableness are arguably
more accurate than such assessments made by police officers.
Third, magistrates' determinations of probable cause and reasonableness
are more consistent due to continuing education'24 and the fewer number of
decision-makers involved. Each magistrate reviews several officers' conclu-
sions of what constitutes probable cause and of what is reasonable.'25 Be-
cause the officers differ among themselves in their conclusions, each magis-
trate brings consistency to determinations of probable cause and reasonable-
ness. Consequently, because fewer individuals are making such determinations,
together with superior training, the sum of all magistrate determinations are
more consistent than the sum of all determinations by law enforcement offi-
cers.
The fourth advantage is that the warrant process generates a contempora-
neous and complete record for subsequent review. The warrant application
states what basis the government agent had before the search for determining
probable cause.'26 In addition, the magistrate's warrant outlines the permissi-
ble scope of the search.'27 These provide the courts with the actual limita-
121. While the exclusion of evidence after a warrantless search immediately benefits the
guilty defendant, exclusion is also beneficial in that it often deters future unconstitutional searches
and seizures by government agents. See Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1187 (1995) ("The
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of
Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect.").
122. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, Are Truth and Justice the American Way? Hits, Runs, Trial
Error: How Courts Let Legal Games Hide the Truth, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 1995, at Cl; Jim
McGee, War on Crime Expands U.S. Prosecutors' Powers; Aggressive Tactics Put Fairness at
Issue, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1993, at Al.
123. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to
"the ... continuing ... explosion in Fourth Amendment litigation").
124. See infra Part Ill.B, recommending additional magistrate training and continuing educa-
tion.
125. See RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE
SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES (1984).
126. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-303 (1986) (requiring that a statement of probable
cause and written allegations of fact, supported by affidavit, be included within the application);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-244 (1983) (similar requirements to those in Colorado).
127. The Fourth Amendment requires particularity as to the place to be searched and the
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tions imposed at the outset of the search and the facts declared by the officer
as the basis for the search. This record eliminates the courts' need to make a
factual determination on the basis of conflicting and after-the-fact versions of
what occurred or was intended. No such record exists when a search occurs
without a warrant.
The fifth advantage of the warrant process is that it allows the officer to
preserve evidence that would otherwise be lost in a suppression hearing if the
officer conducted a warrantless search or seizure based on less than probable
cause. This is because the magistrate alerts the officer that there is less than
probable cause, giving the officer opportunity to gather more evidence. In
contrast, if the officer conducted a warrantless search based on the initial
evidence which did not constitute probable cause, the evidence would be ex-
cluded during a suppression hearing.'
B. The Warrant Process Must Be Fortified So That the Magistrate's
Determination of Probable Cause and Reasonableness Provides Its
Intended Benefits
The warrant process must be fortified if its benefits are to be genuine and
not merely illusory. Three suggestions---one general and two specific-will be
proposed for reinvigorating the warrant process so that the magistrate's check
is meaningful.
First, a magistrate's entry-level job requirements, personality traits, initial
training, and required continuing education must all be scrutinized. The goal
of each requirement must be to increase the magistrate's accuracy and consis-
tency, and to ensure that erroneous determinations of probable cause and rea-
sonableness are minimized. While magistrate determinations are more consis-
tent than those of law enforcement officers, there is still inconsistency among
magistrates.'29 More stringent entry-level requirements, as well as additional
magistrate training and continuing education, should result in more consistent
determinations among magistrates. Such selection, training, and education
requirements must also result in more accurate determinations, since consisten-
cy is only advantageous if the magistrate's determinations are accurate. When
the warrant process results in determinations that are both more accurate and
more consistent, fewer innocent citizens will have their privacy or possessory
interests violated by unconstitutional searches and seizures. In addition to
persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Each state has also explicitly provided
instructions as to the information it deems necessary to meet the Fourth Amendment requirements.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-304 (1986) (requiring a designation sufficient to establish the
location of the premises, vehicles, or persons to be searched and a description of the items consti-
tuting the object authorized to be seized); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-246 (1983) (similar to require-
ments in Colorado).
128. This same advantage has been articulated when police seek arrest warrants:
[An] incentive for police to obtain a[n] [arrest] warrant is that they may desire to present
their evidence to a magistrate so as to be sure that they have probable cause. If probable
cause is lacking, the police will then have an opportunity to gather more evidence rather
than make an illegal arrest that would result in suppression of any evidence seized.
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 455 n.22 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
129. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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being well-educated, a magistrate must not lack the courage to deny warrants
when appropriate. While this personality trait may be difficult to assess, per-
sonality profile tests,' 30 selection interviews, and professional references can
help determine if a magistrate candidate has the requisite confidence and forti-
tude to deny warrants that are either unreasonable or not supported by proba-
ble cause.
This first suggestion can be implemented by either the Supreme Court or
the various legislative bodies. The Supreme Court can take advantage of its
review power and take the lead in establishing rigorous uniform standards for
magistrates. In an effort to increase consistency and accuracy among magis-
trates, the Court can elaborate on the professional requirements set out for
magistrates in Shadwick v. City of Tampa. 3' Shadwick only imposes two re-
quirements: first, the magistrate must be "neutral and detached"; and second,
the magistrate "must be capable of determining whether probable cause exists
for the requested arrest or search."'32 The Court should explain what selec-
tion, performance, and continuing education standards are necessary to satisfy
this second Shadwick requirement.
As an alternative, Congress and the state legislatures can act independent-
ly, and establish more rigorous standards for magistrate selection, perfor-
mance, and continuing education. Some states presently have rigorous stan-
dards.'33 On the other hand, without uniform and base-level criteria, some
jurisdictions will continue to have lax standards for magistrates.'34
Second, to enhance the warrant process and make the magistrate's assess-
ment more accurate, the magistrate should be exposed to potential liability for
flagrant assessment errors. This approach would punish the magistrate more
severely than the public for an unconstitutional search. Currently, in contrast,
when evidence is seized through an unconstitutional search, the court's limited
means of redressing the injury is to exclude the evidence at trial. 5 Dimin-
ished public safety is an unintended consequence that results from the exclu-
sion of incriminating evidence.'36 Consequently, the public, rather than the
130. Commonly utilized personality profile assessment tools include the Minnesota-Multipha-
sic Personality Inventory (MMPI), which appraises abnormal personality traits, and the Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), which ascertains normal personality characteristics.
131. 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
132. Shadwick, 407 U.S. at 350.
133. See, e.g., ALA. R. J. ADMIN., Rule 18 (forbidding a magistrate from issuing a search
warrant unless licensed to practice law in Alabama.); ALASKA R. ADMIN., Rule 19.2(b)(5)
("[Deputy magistrates must) have received training from a training judge or training judge's
designee, prior to appointment as a deputy magistrate, for each judicial duty which the appointee
will be certified to perform."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-108 (1994) ("Every magistrate appointed
pursuant to this section shall be licensed to practice law in Colorado; except that county judges
who are not lawyers may be appointed to serve as magistrates ... to hear detention and bond
matters.").
134. See, e.g., N.D. ADMIN. RULES, Rule 20 ("Minimum qualifications for magistrates shall
include: (a) United States' Citizenship, (b) Physical residence in the county of appointment after
appointment unless physical residence is waived by the appointing and confirming authorities.").
135. When an officer searches with a warrant, and the officer has an objective, good-faith
belief that the warrant is valid, not even this remedy (i.e., exclusion) is available to the court. See
infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
136. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978). "Each time the exclusionary rule is
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magistrate, presently pays the price for the magistrate's blatant assessment
errors. If liable for such errors, however, magistrates would be more careful in
reviewing warrant applications. Arguably, the magistrate's extra care would
result in greater accuracy. If magistrates are more accurate, there will be fewer
unconstitutional searches necessitating exclusion. Hence, the public will be less
burdened.
Magistrates, however, are presently not subject to liability for assessment
errors. A state or local magistrate is granted absolute immunity from §
1983 '3 claims when acting within the scope of the magistrate's official du-
ties. 3 Likewise, a federal magistrate is granted absolute immunity"9 from
claims arising under the judicially created counterpart to § 1983."4 Conse-
quently, a magistrate is presently immune from civil liability for issuing a
warrant that violates an individual's Fourth Amendment rights. 4'
Instead, under this second suggestion, a magistrate would only be entitled
to qualified immunity and would have greater motivation to accurately deter-
mine probable cause. The magistrate would only be immune from liability for
an incorrect determination if a reasonably well trained magistrate in the same
position could have made the same mistake and could have concluded that
probable cause was demonstrated. 2 On the other hand, if the magistrate did
not have an objectively reasonable belief that there was probable cause, then
the victim of the unconstitutional search or seizure could seek compensatory
damages from the magistrate."" Moreover, the victim would be entitled to
applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights. Rele-
vant and reliable evidence is kept from the trier of fact and the search for truth at trial is deflect-
ed." Id.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This statute, which creates a Fourteenth Amendment damages
action, provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Id.
138. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554
(1967). See generally SHELDON H. NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITrrTIONAL TORTS 233-41 (1995)
(noting absolute immunity for judicial conduct, and discussing exceptions to the doctrine). In
contrast, law enforcement officers are only granted qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when
acting within the scope of their official duties. See infra note 156.
139. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-09 (1978).
140. The judicially created counterpart to § 1983 imposes liability on federal agents. Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
141. For a thorough discussion of immunity and intricate aspects of § 1983 actions, see 1
SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION
1983 (3d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1995).
142. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (applying this standard in a Bivens-type
action against an FBI agent who conducted a warrantless search of the plaintiff's home); Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (applying this standard in a § 1983 action against a police offi-
cer who arrested the plaintiff with less than probable cause).
143. See, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (approving recovery of money damages from federal
agents who violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
254-57 (1978) (asserting that damages in a § 1983 action should parallel common law damages
where tort interests parallel the constitutional interest protected).
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punitive damages if the magistrate violated the individual's Fourth Amend-
ment rights with deliberate indifference or reckless disregard.'" Exposing
magistrates to this potential liability would make the warrant process more
meaningful. Additional methods, such as fines, suspensions, dismissal, and
other professional sanctions, should also be considered for making magistrate
assessments more accurate.
Third, to enhance the warrant process and discourage "magistrate shop-
ping,"'45 government agents should have a reduced level of immunity from §
1983'" civil liability (or its judicially recognized counterpart) 47 when they
unearth a second magistrate who will issue a warrant after a first magistrate
has already denied the application based on the same showing of probable
cause. While the Supreme Court has not yet addressed this practice," some
lower courts permit officers to circumvent the warrant requirement in this
way.'" To discourage this practice, government agents should have a re-
duced level of immunity from civil liability when they engage in "magistrate
shopping." Their immunity from liability should be reduced by creating a pre-
sumption that an officer who has already been denied a warrant by one magis-
trate-but then secures one from another magistrate based on the same show-
ing of probable cause-is lacking an objectively reasonable belief as to the
sufficiency of probable cause.
As one alternative to this third recommendation, the Supreme Court could
candidly address and prohibit this practice. Unless the officer is presenting
additional evidence to the magistrate to demonstrate probable cause,' 50 there
is no reasonable justification for permitting an officer to secure a warrant from
a second magistrate after a first magistrate has already denied the application.
Arguably, the Court's tolerance of this practice demeans the entire magistrate
system. 5 '
As another alternative, this third recommendation could be expanded and
144. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (reformatory guard, named as a defendant in a §
1983 action, could be held liable for punitive damages).
145. See United States v. Czuprynski, 8 F.3d 1113, 1118 (6th Cir. 1993) (referring to the
practice of seeking a warrant from a second magistrate after a first magistrate has denied the ap-
plication based on the same showing of probable cause as "judge-shopping"); State v. Oakes, 598
A.2d 119, 122 (Vt. 1991) (referring to the practice of seeking a warrant from a second magistrate
after a first magistrate has denied the application based on the same showing of probable cause as
"magistrate shopping").
146. See supra note 137.
147. See supra note 140.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984) (making only oblique refer-
ences to the undesirability of "magistrate shopping"); United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218 (7th
Cir.) (refusing to accept the opportunity to make a direct ruling on this issue), cert. denied, 497
U.S. 1030 (1990).
149. See supra note 120.
150. While the practice should be discouraged or prohibited when the officer presents the
same evidence of probable cause to both magistrates, this article encourages the practice when the
officer approaches the second magistrate only after the officer's additional investigation has devel-
oped additional evidence to demonstrate probable cause. For a discussion of the advantages that
result when the officer has an opportunity to further investigate and develop probable cause, see
supra note 128 and accompanying text.
151. See generally Charles L. Cantrell, Search Warrants: A View of the Process, 14 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 1 (1989) (discussing the repercussions of this practice).
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made more far-reaching. Whenever an officer obtains a warrant after engaging
in "magistrate shopping," the resulting search should be treated as if it had
been conducted without the benefit of a warrant. None of the incentives nor-
mally available when a warrant is used would then be available to the officer,
and all of the disincentives associated with a warrantless search would apply.
IV. INCENTIVES TO ENCOURAGE GOVERNMENT AGENTS TO USE THE
WARRANT PROCESS AND DISINCENTIVES TO DISCOURAGE WARRANTLESS
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Congress, state legislatures, and the courts should give government inves-
tigators incentives to use the warrant process and disincentives to engage in
warrantless searches and seizures. While this article contends that, as a general
rule, a government agent must obtain a warrant before conducting a search or
seizure, some ambiguous situations will remain-particularly when vague
exigent circumstances arise' 52-where an agent must be permitted to choose
between a warrant or warrantless search. Five incentives and disincentives, to
encourage the use of warrants, will be discussed.
As the first incentive, a government agent should be given greater immu-
nity from civil liability for violating an individual's Fourth Amendment rights
if the agent acts pursuant to a judicial warrant. An officer who conducts an
unconstitutional search or seizure is subject to civil liability'53 under either §
1983 's or its judicially recognized counterpart.'55 Presently, law enforce-
ment officers are only entitled to qualified immunity from suits brought
against them.'56 Consequently, a law enforcement agent can now be held civ-
illy liable for an unconstitutional search or seizure even when acting pursuant
to a search warrant. The magistrate's determination does not necessarily insu-
late the officer. The test is whether a reasonably well trained officer in the
defendant officer's position would have known that probable cause was lack-
ing.
57
To achieve this first incentive, the agent's immunity from § 1983 civil
liability and its judicially recognized counterpart should be increased by creat-
ing a presumption in the agent's favor when the agent acts pursuant to a
search warrant. When the officer proceeds on the basis of a warrant that has
been issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, the officer should be entitled
to a presumption that the officer's belief regarding the sufficiency of probable
152. See infra part V.A.
153. In addition to liability under § 1983 and its judicially recognized Bivens-type counter-
part, government agents who conduct unconstitutional searches or seizures may also be liable
under state tort law, state statutes, or other federal statutes. While these additional areas of liability
will not be expressly addressed, this article recommends that the incentive of increased immunity
be made available in any civil action against an officer when the officer acts pursuant to a judicial
warrant.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
155. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 473, 508-09 (1978).
156. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) ("For executive officials in gener-
al ... our cases make plain that qualified immunity represents the norm [in a Bivens-type ac-
tionl.").
157. See supra note 142.
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cause is objectively reasonable. While a plaintiff could offer rebuttal evidence,
the defendant would have the benefit of the presumption.
As a second incentive for government agents to use warrants, the burden
of production and persuasion should be placed on the defendant if a warrant
has been obtained to show that a search or seizure is unconstitutional. While
many states currently place these burdens on the defendant,' some states
place the burden of production and persuasion on the government even when
the officer conducts the search pursuant to a warrant."9 As an incentive, this
article instead recommends that these burdens uniformly be placed on the
defendant whenever a warrant is used. On the other hand, if the officer con-
ducts a warrantless search or seizure, the burden is now placed, and should
remain, on the prosecution to prove that the warrantless search is constitution-
al." To discourage warrantless activity, the state should have to prove that
the search was reasonable, the search was based on probable cause, and one of
the exceptions to the Warrant Clause justified the warrantless search.
A third inducement for government agents to use warrants involves limita-
tions on the time available to the defendant to move for suppression. Present-
ly, some states require a defendant to make a suppression motion prior to trial
or lose the claim. 6' Other states allow a defendant to make a suppression
motion during the trial. 62 This article recommends that the defendant should
be required to either challenge the constitutionality of the seized evidence
before trial or forfeit the right to the motion when an officer conducts the
search with a warrant. This incentive would provide several benefits to the
prosecution, including reducing the prosecutor's uncertainty regarding the
witnesses to be called and the evidence to be adduced at trial. In addition, this
incentive could provide the prosecutor with an opportunity to immediately
appeal an adverse ruling. In contrast, if the officer conducts a warrantless
search, the defendant should be permitted to challenge the search anytime
prior to, or during, trial.
158. See, e.g., People v. Hoskins, 461 N.E.2d 941, 942 (I11.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 840
(1984); State v. Milliom, 794 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Mo. 1990).
159. See, e.g., People v. Crow, 789 P.2d 1104 (Colo. 1990); State v. Slaughter, 315 S.E.2d
865 (Ga. 1984); Brooks v. State, 497 N.E.2d 210 (Ind. 1986); State v. Heald, 314 A.2d 820 (Me.
1973); Canning v. State, 226 So. 2d 747 (Miss. 1969). See generally Stephen A. Saltzburg, Stan-
dards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1975) (discussing ap-
proaches to determining preliminary questions of fact).
160. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974).
161. See United States v. Sisca, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974);
State v. Neese, 616 P.2d 959 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Brogdon, 426 So. 2d 158 (La. 1983);
State v. Baker, 409 A.2d 216 (Me. 1979); State v. Madsen, 414 N.W.2d 280 (Neb. 1987); State v.
Neset, 462 N.W.2d 175 (N.D. 1990). See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 12, 41 (requiring motions to
suppress evidence be raised prior to trial).
162. See State v. Boose, 202 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1972); Shanks v. Commonwealth, 504
S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1974); State v. Hicks, 488 N.W.2d 359 (Neb. 1992); State v. Ortega, 836 P.2d
639 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); Whitnel v. State, 564 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). Some
jurisdictions predicate this right on meeting certain conditions. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
975(b), -976(b) (1994). The North Carolina statutes as interpreted by the North Carolina Supreme
Court allow the defendant to make such a motion during trial when the prosecution seeks to ad-
duce evidence from a warrantless search, but denies the defendant the right if the prosecution
gives at least 20 working days notice before trial of the intent to introduce such seized evidence at
trial. State v. Hill, 240 S.E.2d 794, 803 (N.C. 1978).
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A fourth incentive to use warrants is to permit the prosecution to make an
interlocutory appeal of all suppression rulings favorable to the defense when-
ever the suppressed evidence was acquired with a warrant. On the other hand,
the corresponding disincentive to government agents that should result from
not using warrants is that the prosecution should forfeit the right to an inter-
locutory appeal. As noted above, when a search is conducted pursuant to a
warrant, the defendant should be required to raise relevant suppression motions
prior to trial. If the court rules against the state, the state should then be per-
mitted to make an interlocutory appeal. The trial could then be stayed until the
issue is resolved. The state would then have the advantage, if the suppression
order is overturned, of using the previously excluded evidence at trial. The
availability to the prosecution of immediate appellate review encourages gov-
ernment use of warrants. In contrast, when a government agent does not use a
warrant, the prosecution should lose the right to appeal suppression rulings fa-
vorable to the defense. As noted, when a warrantless search occurs, the defen-
dant should be permitted to challenge the search anytime prior to, or during,
trial. Moreover, if the court rules against the state, the state should not be
permitted to make an immediate appeal. Consequently, the state would lose
any advantage that would result from using the excluded evidence at trial.
While some states presently deny the prosecution immediate appellate review
from suppression rulings favorable to the defense,'63 this article recommends
that the government uniformly be denied immediate review when the warrant
process is not used.
As a fifth inducement for government agents to use warrants, the category
of victims who have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search
should be broadened when no warrant is used. Over the years, the Supreme
Court has narrowed the class of individuals who have standing to challenge
the constitutionality of a search." 4 An individual who is legitimately on the
premises searched no longer has automatic standing to challenge the
search. 65 Additionally, an individual who is charged with criminal posses-
sion no longer has automatic standing simply because the individual legally
possesses the item searched." Presently, standing is only granted to an indi-
vidual who has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the item searched.'67
To encourage the use of warrants, only the present limited category of
individuals recognized in Rakas 6e should continue to have standing to chal-
lenge a search or seizure conducted with a warrant. However, when the police
163. See, e.g., State v. Parks, 415 So. 2d 704, 706 (Miss. 1982) (denying interlocutory ap-
peal). But see, e.g., State v. Perbix, 331 N.W.2d 14, 17 (N.D. 1983) (allowing interlocutory ap-
peal).
164. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92 (1980) ("We simply decline to use possession
of a seized good as a substitute for a factual finding that the owner of the good had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the area searched."); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978) (reject-
ing automatic standing because it "creates too broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amend-
ment rights").
165. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142.
166. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
167. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143.
168. Id.
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choose not to use a warrant, the class of individuals permitted to challenge the
search or seizure should be broadened. Logically, anyone against whom seized
evidence will be used should have standing to challenge the constitutionality
of the search or seizure. Standing could be granted to this broader class of
individuals when government agents choose to act without warrants to discour-
age warrantless activity. By expanding the category of victims who have
standing to challenge warrantless searches, prosecutors will be induced to
persuade government agents to obtain warrants before searching, and thus re-
duce the number of potential suppression hearings at which they will have to
defend.
V. THERE SHOULD BE FEWER EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
AND No ADDITIONAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. Due to Technological Advances, the Exigent Circumstances Exception to
the Warrant Requirement Should Be Narrowed, and Other Exceptions
Should Be Studied, Narrowed, and Eliminated
The Supreme Court should eliminate or narrow some of the exceptions to
the warrant requirement and permit fewer warrantless searches and seizures
because of the safeguards that warrants provide and the historical basis sup-
porting their use. This is currently possible given advances in computer and
telecommunications technology. Furthermore, future technological advances
will enable the subsequent elimination or narrowing of additional exceptions to
the warrant requirement.
Perhaps the exigent circumstances exception69 is foremost among the
exceptions affected by new technology. Under the exigent circumstances ex-
ception, an officer may conduct a search without a warrant if the officer has
probable cause to believe that the person or item to be searched will be
gone," the evidence will be destroyed, 7' or someone will be put in dan-
ger '7 if the officer takes the time to obtain a warrant before searching. In
addition to this freestanding exigent circumstances exception, most of the other
exceptions to the warrant requirement were initially based on exigency. 7'
Given the prior difficulty of obtaining a warrant and the attending exigent
circumstances, the Supreme Court was compelled, in many situations, to sacri-
fice the vital safeguards provided by the warrant requirement.
Advances in electronic and telecommunications technology, however, have
eliminated many of the temporal and geographic hurdles which previously
169. See Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967) (explaining that
exigent circumstances do not require a warrant).
170. United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 769 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1119 (1991).
171. United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1512 (6th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Socey, 846 F.2d 1439, 1445 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 858 (1988).
172. United States v. Perez, 440 F. Supp. 272, 287 (N.D. Ohio 1977), affd, 571 F.2d 584
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 998 (1978); People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121, 1140 (Cal. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973).
173. See supra note 10; see also infra note 179 and accompanying text.
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prolonged the time needed to obtain a warrant. Consequently, trial courts must
give greater scrutiny when government agents invoke the exigent circum-
stances exception. A warrantless search' or seizure should only be permit-
ted when the circumstances of the case are such that an officer would not even
be able to seek an electronic warrant. While many courts have already refused
to permit the exigent circumstances exception in situations where the officer
could have obtained a telephone warrant,' 71 courts must probe further. To
justify a warrantless search on the basis of exigency, the government must
show that the agent could not have obtained an electronic warrant in time to
avoid the anticipated exigency.
Additional judicial scrutiny of exigent warrantless searches provides an
added benefit. While government agents should not be permitted to deliberate-
ly create exigent circumstances to circumvent the warrant requirement, courts
hesitate to scrutinize defense claims that the police intentionally manufactured
an exigency to circumvent the warrant requirement. 76 In addition, the
174. Arguably, an exigency that justifies a warrantless seizure should not automatically justify
a warrantless search. If the item (e.g., a suitcase) to be searched can be seized while the police
obtain a warrant to search it, then the police should refrain from searching the seized item until
the search warrant is obtained:
In our view, when no exigency is shown to support the need for an immediate search,
the Warrant Clause places the line at the point where the property to be searched comes
under the exclusive dominion of police authority. Respondents were therefore entitled to
the protection of the Warrant Clause with the evaluation of a neutral magistrate, before
their privacy interests in the contents of the footlocker were invaded.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1977).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 56 F.3d 265, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("They could have
secured the bedroom and telephoned a magistrate for a search warrant .... "); United States v.
Patino, 830 F.2d 1413, 1416-17 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding no exigency existed because a telephone
warrant could have been obtained in the 30 minute period), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1069 (1989);
United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[C]ourts must also consider
the amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant by telephone in determining whether exigent
circumstances exist."); United States v. Baker, 520 F. Supp. 1080, 1083 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (ex-
plaining that one hour and fifteen minutes was "abundant" time to obtain a telephone warrant,
therefore no exigency existed). But see, e.g., United States v. Tarazon, 989 F.2d 1045, 1050 (9th
Cir.) (permitting a warrantless search after concluding that 30 minutes was not enough time to
obtain a telephone warrant), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 155 (1993); United States v. Cuaron, 700
F.2d 582, 589-90 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that 20 to 30 minutes was not enough time to obtain a
telephone warrant).
This article does not encourage the use of telephone warrants. The application for, and
issuance of, a telephone warrant lacks the safeguards which are present when either a computer
modem or facsimile is used. While this procedure frees the officer of the temporal and geographic
hurdles of submitting a warrant application, it does not have the advantage of providing a contem-
poraneous and complete record of the warrant application. The telephonic application can be re-
corded by the magistrate, but the risk is present that the recording will not be accurately tran-
scribed. See, e.g., State v. Cook, 498 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1993) (noting that the magistrate issued a
search warrant on the basis of a telephone application which was not recorded, and that neither the
officer nor the magistrate made notes of the conversation). Additionally, unless the officer pro-
ceeds on the basis of the magistrate's oral authorization, the officer must still use valuable time to
obtain the issued warrant. Even if the officer is permitted to proceed on the basis of an oral war-
rant, applications made by telephone are slower than those submitted by facsimile or modem.
With a telephone warrant, the requesting officer must completely read the application over the
telephone before the magistrate's assessment can begin.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 950-51 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Houle, 603 F.2d
1297, 1300 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Scheffer, 463 F.2d 567, 575 (5th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. 409 U.S. 984 (1972).
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Supreme Court has not explicitly prohibited the practice. Until the Court does
so, this troublesome practice would be diminished if the exception only ap-
plied when the circumstances of the case were such that an officer was not
able to seek an electronic warrant. Because computer and facsimile warrants
eliminate many of the temporal and geographic hurdles to obtaining a warrant,
it becomes more difficult for criminal investigators to intentionally create the
type of exigent circumstances that would permit them to proceed without a
warrant.
The exigent circumstances exception is not the sole existing exception
which could presently be narrowed due to technological advances. The
Supreme Court should use its review power to thoroughly consider all other
exceptions and determine which should be narrowed or eliminated in light of
advances in computer and telecommunications technology. The automobile
exception, and exceptions arising under the Court's "special needs" analy-
sis,' are among the exceptions the Court should review.
The automobile exception allows a government agent to search an auto-
mobile without a warrant as long as the agent has probable cause to believe
that the vehicle contains evidence relating to criminal activity.'78 This in-
terpretation of the automobile exception deletes the warrant requirement, by-
passes the magistrate, and allows a government agent to search a vehicle based
on the agent's own determination of probable cause. The agent can search the
vehicle even where there is no danger that the automobile will be moved.
While the automobile exception was originally permitted because of the inher-
ent mobility of-and encompassing exigency surrounding-the automo-
bile,'79 the exception is now based on the reasoning that one has a reduced
expectation of privacy in the automobile.'8 ° Thus, the police may conduct a
warrantless search of a vehicle even if it is incapable of being moved. 8'
Arguably, one's expectation of privacy in the automobile is as great as, or
greater than, it is in many other items of personal property. Given the mobility
of American society, the percentage of the population engaged in commuting,
and the amount of time people spend in automobiles, it seems unrealistic to
conclude that an individual's automobile should be subject to a reduced expec-
tation of privacy. Indeed, one Justice's comment can be interpreted as suggest-
ing that in order to circumvent constitutional requirements, the Court has at
times insincerely concluded that one has a lesser, or no, expectation of priva-
cy: "Our intricate body of law regarding 'reasonable expectation of privacy'
has been developed largely as a means of creating these exceptions, enabling a
search to be denominated not a Fourth Amendment 'search' and therefore not
subject to the general warrant requirement.' 82
The Court should not permit the warrantless search of an automobile
177. See infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
178. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
179. Id. at 146.
180. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985).
181. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 n.10 (1970) (permitting the warrantless search of
an automobile after the owner had been arrested and the vehicle taken to the police station).
182. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 636 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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unless it can be justified on the basis of a true exigency rather than a theoreti-
cal reduced expectation of privacy. Perhaps the balance between the
government's investigative powers and individual privacy and liberty interests
would be better maintained if the automobile exception as it now exists were
eliminated. Instead, taking advantage of up-to-date computer and telecommuni-
cations technology, the preferred method of searching an automobile would be
for the police to comply with the warrant requirement. A warrantless automo-
bile search would then be unconstitutional unless it satisfied the stricter exi-
gent circumstances exception proposed above. There would be no separate and
independent automobile exception.
The Court is also increasingly creating exceptions to the warrant require-
ment through its "special needs" analysis.'83 The Court applies this analysis
when it concludes that government agents have "special needs" beyond crimi-
nal law enforcement. Under this analysis, the Court has not only suspended
the warrant requirement, but it has increasingly been willing to dispense with
one or both of the other Fourth Amendment threshold requirements of proba-
ble cause and individualized suspicion." 4 Recently, the Court used this "spe-
cial needs" analysis to permit public school officials to test student athletes for
drug usage without a warrant, without probable cause, and without any indi-
vidualized suspicion.'85
While a useful analysis of each "special needs" exception is beyond the
scope of this article, the Court must consider these exceptions to determine
which can be narrowed or eliminated in light of advances in computer and
telecommunications technology. Many of these "special needs" exceptions
seem to be created out of desperation rather than concern for Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine. While they are permitted because of the government's interest
in something other than criminal law enforcement, the Supreme Court has not
hesitated to permit the government to use the fruits of the search to convict
the search victim of a crime. 86 Ultimately, and regrettably, the "special
needs" exceptions may permanently realign traditional Fourth Amendment
183. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (per-
mitting suspicionless and warrantless urine testing of employees); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709, 720-25 (1987) (allowing public employers to conduct warrantless searches of employees'
desks and offices); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (allowing the warrantless
search of a child's possessions within school on the basis of reasonable suspicion); United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976) (permitting the temporary suspicionless seizure of
motorists, without a warrant, at permanent checkpoints removed from the border); Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (allowing warrantless and suspicionless border
searches).
184. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454 (1990) (holding that
sobriety checkpoints are constitutional without probable cause, individualized suspicion, or a war-
rant); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666-67 (1989) (allowing
warrantless and suspicionless drug testing).
185. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
186. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 650-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that a government agency
conducting suspicionless and warrantless searches of its employees "appear[s] to invite criminal
prosecutors to obtain the blood and urine samples drawn by the [agency] and use them as the
basis of criminal investigations and trials" against its employees, notwithstanding that the govern-
ment is only permitted to draw these samples because it claims to be conducting these searches on
the basis of a special need other than law enforcement).
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interests with minimal regard for the individual." 7
B. A New "Good Faith" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule Eliminates a
Crucial Check on the Unbridled Discretion of Government Agents, and
Should Not Be Created
Under existing law, evidence obtained by government agents through a
search or seizure conducted in the preferred manner-with a warrant-is al-
ready admissible in court against a criminal defendant. 8 The present Leon
"good faith" exception permits the use of evidence against a criminal defen-
dant in either state or federal court, even if it is obtained pursuant to a consti-
tutionally defective warrant. 9 The existing "good faith" exception permits
use of the evidence as long as the officer has an objective, good-faith belief
that the warrant is valid, the officer acts within the scope of the warrant, and
the issuing magistrate is neutral and detached.'
Notwithstanding the existing "good faith" exception to the exclusionary
rule, however, many commentators have been anticipating an additional "good
faith" exception--one that also permits the use of unconstitutionally seized
evidence when an officer elects not to use the warrant process. 9' One exam-
ple of such an exception has been advanced in Congress as part of the Repub-
lican party's "Contract with America."'92 The Exclusionary Rule Reform Act
of 1995,' if enacted and upheld by the Supreme Court, 94 would permit
187. See generally Andrea Lewis, Comment, Drug Testing: Can Privacy Interests Be Pro-
tected Under the "Special Needs" Doctrine?, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1013, 1033 (1990) (criticizing
the "special needs" doctrine for essentially making balancing the norm rather than the exception).
188. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 919 n.20, 920, 923.
191. See, Ronald J. Bacigal, An Alternative Approach to the Good Faith Controversy, 37
MERCER L. REV. 957, 976 (1986) ("The flexibility inherent in a totality of the circumstances test
allows the Court to attach some unspecified weight to police motivation, instead of being forced
to Leon's all-or-nothing decision in good faith."); Craig M. Bradley, The "Good Faith Exception"
Cases: Reasonable Exercises in Futility, 60 IND. L.J. 287, 303 (1985) (noting that "the primary
focus of attention should be on clarifying the rules rather than on making them increasingly un-
clear by focusing attention on penalties and exceptions"); Elizabeth P. Marsh, On Rollercoasters,
Submarines, and Judicial Shipwrecks: Acoustic Separation and the Good Faith Exception to the
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 941, 1016 ("A good faith exception
similar to the mistake defenses in criminal law would restore partially the balance between the
conduct rule and the decisional rule.").
192. The "Contract with America," as explained by Congressman Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.),
Speaker of the House, is "a planning model [setting forth the Party's] vision, strategies, projects
and tactics." Newt Gingrich, 1995 Summer Meeting, Republican National Committee, Phila., Pa.
(July 14, 1995).
193. Introduced on January 25, 1995, the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act of 1995 requires:
Evidence which is obtained as a result of a search or seizure shall not be excluded...
on the ground that the search or seizure was in violation of the Fourth Amendment...
if the search or seizure was carried out in circumstances justifying an objectively reason-
able belief that it was in conformity with the Fourth Amendment. The fact that evidence
was obtained pursuant to and within the scope of a warrant constitutes prima facie evi-
dence of the existence of such circumstances.
Exclusionary Rule Reform Act of 1995, H.R. REP. No. 104-17, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1995).
194. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court is the
"ultimate interpreter of the Constitution"); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
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prosecutors to use unconstitutionally seized evidence in federal court, even if
no warrant was used, as long as the officer had an objectively reasonable
belief that the search or seizure was constitutional.
An additional "good faith" exception is not necessary when the warrant
process is followed and, while enactment of a new exception may result in
political gain to its sponsors,'95 such an exception is likely to produce a mul-
titude of unintended new harms. Perhaps most insufferable among these harms
is that the new exception would abolish any significant check-either before
or after-on the uninhibited discretion of government agents when they search
and seize evidence. This check would be absent regardless of how reasonable
a citizen's expectation of privacy in the area searched or the item seized.
Presently, in contrast, there is a check on the officer's actions either prior to
the search or afterwards: if the search is conducted with a warrant, a magis-
trate screens the officer's actions in advance;'9if the search is conducted
without a warrant, a judge reviews the officer's actions afterwards during a
suppression hearing.'97 Under an additional "good faith" exception, all mean-
ingful review would be abolished. Unlike the existing Leon "good faith" ex-
ception, the proposed exception abolishes the need for prior review by a mag-
istrate, and because it essentially discontinues the suppression of unconstitu-
tional evidence, the proposed exception also eliminates any meaningful subse-
quent judicial review.
Regrettably, an additional "good faith" exception to the exclusionary
rule-one that arises when an officer elects not to use the warrant pro-
cess-confers upon government agents virtually unbridled discretion to in-
trude, search, and seize evidence. In contrast, the warrant process and present
"good faith" exception more fittingly balance and satisfy relevant Fourth
Amendment liberty, privacy, and security interests. When government agents
follow the warrant requirement, a citizen's liberty and privacy interests can be
protected and effective law enforcement measures can be secured. The magis-
trate will customarily serve as a check on government discretion and-when
the magistrate errs---evidence seized unconstitutionally, but in good faith, will
(1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is."); see also Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2491 (1995) ("Were we to accept the Justice
Department's objection ... we would be surrendering to the Executive Branch our role in enforc-
ing the constitutional limits on race-based official action. We may not do so.").
195. See Congress' Get Tough Act Is a Real 'Crime', USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 1990, at A12
("Like its predecessors... the 1990 crime bill ... won't do much to protect us from crime. At
best, it will only help its perpetrators get re-elected."); Debra J. Saunders, Crime: What Congress
Thinks of You, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 13, 1994, at A23 ("President Clinton put the heat on Congress
to pass a version of the Senate $22 billion omnibus crime bill, and quickly .... Clinton won't
blow this opportunity to... look effective and curry favor with a crime-wary electorate.").
196. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
197. A defendant may also be entitled to both forms of review: even when a magistrate has
reviewed the search warrant request in advance, a defendant can obtain subsequent judicial review
at a suppression hearing. However, in this situation the judge does not make a de novo determina-
tion of probable cause but merely determines whether there was a substantial basis for the magis-
trate to find probable cause, and the judge gives great discretion to the magistrate's initial determi-
nation. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). Even if the magistrate incorrectly issues a
constitutionally defective warrant, the judge will not suppress the seized evidence if the officer
acted in objective, good-faith reliance upon the warrant. See supra notes 188-90.
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be used in court against a criminal defendant. Use of the warrant process,
together with the existing Leon "good faith" exception, eliminates the need for
either Congress or the courts to create a new "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule.
CONCLUSION
Today's advanced computer, facsimile, and cellular technology permits the
Supreme Court to reaffirm a meaningful commitment to the warrant require-
ment. Due to the availability of portable and lightweight cellular facsimile
machines, the ability to transmit electronic documents directly between cellular
computer modems, and the continual miniaturization of computer hardware, an
officer can now quickly-and without leaving the investigation scene-obtain
a warrant. The officer can electronically transmit a written but wireless war-
rant application and affidavit to the magistrate. The magistrate can then trans-
mit the approved warrant back to the officer in the same fashion. Because
investigators can now quickly obtain a warrant without leaving the area of
investigation, the Court has the ability to respond to exigent circumstances and
declare a renewed commitment to the warrant requirement.
The warrant requirement is consistent with the Framers' original intent in
crafting the Fourth Amendment. The Framers endorsed a three-tiered approach
to deterring capricious searches and seizures. First, they agreed to permit some
types of warrantless searches. They were comfortable with these warrantless
searches because of their belief that existing common law remedies would
continue to prevent such warrantless searches from becoming threatening.
Second, the Framers desired to prohibit any new types of search unless they
were conducted pursuant to a warrant. Third, to prevent the new warrant re-
quirement from becoming meaningless, the Framers intended that it be de-
manding enough to deter capricious government searches. By limiting the
circumstances under which a warrant could be issued, the Framers sought to
protect citizens from the type of warrant abuse similar to that recently suffered
through the use of general warrants and writs of assistance under English rule.
The warrant requirement is also harmonious with over one hundred years
of Supreme Court precedent. Recently, however, the Court has displayed an
increased willingness to ignore the Warrant Clause and focus exclusively on
the reasonableness clause through both its traditional analysis and the Court's
"special needs" analysis. This has resulted in an increase in the creation of
new exceptions to the warrant requirement. This trend must cease, and the
Court must re-embrace the warrant requirement.
While the warrant requirement should be embraced because it is compati-
ble with the Framers' original intent and over one hundred years of Supreme
Court precedent, the requirement should also be championed because it pro-
duces several advantages. Its quintessential advantage is that it allows thresh-
old decisions regarding the intrusion into a citizen's liberty and privacy to be
made in an orderly, deliberate, and impartial manner. Additional advantages of
the warrant process include the following: rather than award the guilty defen-
dant a windfall, the warrant process protects the innocent, law-abiding citizen;
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magistrate determinations of reasonableness and probable cause are more
accurate, since the magistrate has greater opportunity to stay abreast of contin-
uing developments regarding search and seizure law; due to continuing magis-
trate education and because fewer decision-makers are involved, a magistrate's
determinations of probable cause and reasonableness are more consistent; it
eliminates the need for courts to make uncertain factual determinations during
subsequent review because the warrant process generates a contemporaneous
and complete record of the government's basis for searching and of the scope
of search initially authorized; and the warrant process allows the officer to
preserve evidence that would otherwise be excluded due to a premature search,
since the officer can gather more facts and strengthen the showing of probable
cause if a magistrate has denied the officer's initial request.
The warrant process must also be improved to ensure that the magistrate's
review provides a genuine check on the government's unrestrained discretion
to search and seize evidence. The assessment must be meaningful, and not
merely the spontaneous and routine approval of a police officer's application
for a warrant. First, the Supreme Court must define what is constitutionally re-
quired-professionally and personally-for one to become and remain a mag-
istrate. The Court must be more rigorous than it was in Shadwick98 in artic-
ulating the entry-level, initial training, and continuing education requirements
for a magistrate. Each requirement must increase the accuracy and consistency
of the magistrate's assessment. If the Court is unwilling to establish rigorous
uniform standards for magistrates, Congress and the state legislatures should
establish the needed standards.
A second suggestion for enhancing the warrant process is to make a mag-
istrate liable for flagrant assessment errors. A magistrate should no longer be
absolutely immune from § 1983 claims or Bivens-type'9 claims. Instead, a
magistrate should only be entitled to qualified immunity. In order to minimize
potential liability, magistrates will then be more accurate in their determina-
tions of reasonableness and probable cause. Third, to reinforce the warrant
process, government agents must have a reduced level of immunity from civil
liability when they seek and find a second magistrate who will issue a warrant
after a first magistrate has already denied the application based on the same
showing of probable cause. This practice of "magistrate shopping" mocks the
warrant requirement.
While this article has sought to demonstrate why the warrant requirement
must be the norm rather than the exception, some uncertain situations will
remain where an officer must be allowed to choose between using a warrant
or conducting a warrantless search. To encourage government agents to use
the warrant process when these ambiguous situations arise, Congress, state
legislatures, and the courts must implement the following incentives and
disincentives: agents must be given greater immunity from civil liability when
they conduct a search pursuant to a judicial warrant; the burden must be
placed on the defendant to show that a search or seizure was unconstitutional
198. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
199. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
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when the officer conducts the search pursuant to a warrant; when a warrant is
used, the defendant must be deemed to forfeit the right to a suppression hear-
ing unless the defendant challenges the constitutionality of the seized evidence
prior to the commencement of trial; when a trial court suppresses evidence
seized pursuant to a warrant, the trial must be stayed and the prosecution
given an opportunity for immediate appellate review, thereby giving the gov-
ernment an opportunity to use the excluded evidence at trial; and, when a
government agent conducts a warrantless search, the class of victims who have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search must be expanded.
In addition to articulating a new commitment to the warrant requirement,
the Supreme Court must eliminate or narrow some of its previously created
exceptions that are no longer necessary due to current technology. Foremost
among these is the exigent circumstances exception. This exception must be
narrowed, since today's advanced technology eliminates much of the time and
many of the geographic hurdles which previously delayed obtaining a warrant.
The exigent circumstances exception should be modified so that it only per-
mits a warrantless search if an officer is unable to obtain a facsimile or com-
puter warrant via cellular modem before searching. A second exception, the
automobile exception, should be eliminated entirely. The Court should only
permit the search of an automobile without a warrant if the stricter exigent
circumstances test has been satisfied. The exigency must be such that the
officer does not even have the time to obtain an electronic warrant prior to
searching the vehicle. In addition to these two exceptions, the Court should
diligently use its review process to determine which additional excep-
tions-arising under either the Court's traditional analysis or its "special
needs" analysis-should be narrowed or eliminated due to advances in tele-
communications technology.
While existing exceptions to the warrant requirement should be narrowed
or eliminated, no further changes should be made to the exclusionary rule.
Neither Congress nor the courts should create a new "good faith" exception to
the rule. A new exception would eliminate a crucial check on the uncontrolled
discretion of government agents. Moreover, a new exception serves no purpose
when the warrant process is used since evidence obtained by government
agents with a warrant is already admissible in court under existing law, even if
the warrant is constitutionally defective.
The Court no longer has to choose between the warrant requirement and
warrantless searches because of advances in telecommunications technology.
Today's technology promotes a superior balance between the government's
need to swiftly investigate during exigent circumstances, and an individual's
privacy and liberty interests. Due to today's advanced telecommunications
technology, the Supreme Court has the opportunity, without sacrificing public
safety, to reclaim and preserve the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
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